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M

Y topic, bankruptcy issues1 and CERCLA Reauthorization, 2 is a
very easy one. Bankruptcy issues are not addressed in any of
the CERCLA Reauthorization proposals that have been made so far,
so I could just stop there.

But what I thought I would do is talk about where we are in the
interface between bankruptcy and CERCLA, why it has gotten so
much attention, and what some of the remaining issues are. After
that, I will explain why these issues are unlikely to get addressed in
CERCLA reauthorization. I am not going to go into any great detail

on any of these issues, but I will speak about some of the main ones.
There are a couple of reasons, in general, why this area has gotten
so much attention, and why people talk about the "conflict" between
CERCLA and the bankruptcy laws. 3 One fundamental reason is that
by and large, the bankruptcy laws assume that one can know what a
company's liabilities are at one point in time, namely the time that it
goes into bankruptcy. CERCLA claims, like other "delayed manifes-

t This speech was presented at the Fordham Symposium, Superfund
Reauthorization: Agenda for the 90's, held at Fordham University School of Law on
March 11, 1994.
* Deputy Chief Environmental Enforcement Section, U.S. Dept. of Justice;
B.A., M.A. Yeshiva Umversity, 1975; J.D., New York University, 1977.
1. Bankruptcy law is delineated in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, also
known as the "Bankruptcy Code" or simply "the Code." Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat.
2549 (1978) (codified as amended in 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. 1992)).
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. 1992)). Congress subsequently amended CERCLA by
enacting the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub.
L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (amending scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §9 9601-9675
(1988)) [hereinafter Superfund]. Congressional funding of Superfund will expire in
1994, accounting for the current debate over the details of possible CERCLA amendments. For the existing Clinton Administration reauthorization proposal, see S.1834,
103d Cong. (1994) [hereinafter Reauthorization].
3. See, e.g., In re Combustion Equip. Assocs., 838 F.2d 35,37 (2d Cir. 1988) ("The
conflict [between CERCLA and the Code] begins at a basic level, since the goal of
holding liable those responsible for the pollution - is at odds with
CERCLA the premise of bankruptcy, which [is] to allow [a] debtor a fresh start by freeing them
liability."); United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1002
(2d Cir. 1991) ("We agree that the Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA point toward
competing objectives. The Code aims to provide reorganized debtors with a fresh
"); Jonathan K. Van
start. . CERCLA alms to clean up environmental damage
Patten & Richard D. Puetz, Bankruptcy and Environmental Obligations: The Clash
Between Private Relief and Public Policy, 35 S.D. L. REv. 220, 220-23 (1990).
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tation" type of claims,4 do not fit well into that framework. CERCLA
liabilities arise and continue over long periods of time. Trying to fit
that type of liability scheme into a structure that assumes one can take
a business at a point in time, know what its assets are, and know what
its liabilities are, presents a number of problems.
The other fundamental issue that comes up m this area is the fact
that bankruptcy is designed to deal with monetary claims. People owe
other people money Like bankruptcy, CERCLA deals with money,
often large amounts of money,5 and m part deals with obligations to
pay money, 6 but not exclusively CERCLA also deals with obligations
to do clean-ups and undertake work.7 Therefore, CERCLA, like
other environmental statutes under which liable parties can be required to undertake work,8 raises questions as to how one fits those
types of obligations - that will often cost a great of money but that
are not necessarily resolved in monetary terms - into a framework
which looks at everything in monetary terms.
What are the issues that come up, then, in this particular area?9 A
few issues are related to the fundamental concept in all of bankruptcy
law: the determination of what is a claim. 1 This is a fundamental concept, because only claims can be addressed in a bankruptcy situa4. See, e.g., Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1988) (asbestos); Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir. 1988) (faulty I.U.D.s).
5. In 1989, EPA estimated that it would cost thirty billion dollars to clean up the

1,200 sites on the National Priority List (NPL). A

MANAGEMENT REVIEW OF THE
SUPERFUND PROGRAM 3 (1989). Some researchers believe that the NPL will eventually encompass between 2,000 and 10,000 sites. E.W COLGLAZIER ET AL., EsTIMATING RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS FOR NPL SITES 1 (Dec. 1991). The cost would then
reach into the hundreds of billions of dollars. RICHARD C. GASKINS, ENVIRONMEN-

64-65, 231 (1989).
One should not forget that these costs do not include the bill for studies at each site to
determine the scope of the contamination. Such studies include a Remedial Investigation (RI), dealing with the nature and breadth of the contamination, as well as a
Feasibility Study (FS), that evaluates the possible remedies. SHELDON M. NOVICK,
Tim LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 13.05(s)(f)(ii)(A). The average cost of
an RIIFS is $800,000. DAVID SIVE & FRANK FRIEDMAN, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 132 (1987).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (Supp. 1992) (EPA has authority to clean up site);
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. 1992) (after clean-up, EPA can bring a cost recovery action against a potentially responsible party (PRP)).
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. 1992).
8. For example, under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, EPA can
require regulated persons to take corrective action. RCRA §§ 3008(h), 3004(u); 42
U.S.C. §§ 6928(h), 6924(u) (Supp. 1992).
9. See generally Kathryn R. Heidt, Environmental Obligations in Bankruptcy: A
FundamentalFramework, 44 U. FLA. L. REV 153 (1992).
10. A "claim" is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1992):
(5) "claim" means (A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach
gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable

TAL ACCIDENTS, PERSONAL INJURY, AND PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY
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tion. 11 Only creditors who have claims, as the term is defined, can
share m the distribution of bankruptcy estates. 2 Only creditors who
have claims can have such claims discharged.' 3
So, one of the fundamental issues that has been the subject of much
litigation is discovering when a CERCLA claim arises for bankruptcy
purposes. 4 Does it arise at the very earliest point, when compames
dispose of waste at a site,15 or at the very latest when EPA has finished
its cleanup at the site,' 6 or at some point in the middle?' 7
Compames in bankruptcy, particularly those filing under Chapter
11, have generally argued for claims to trigger at the earliest possible
moment. The earlier the trigger, the greater amount of a company's
CERCLA liabilities that may be addressed and discharged in its bankruptcy proceeding. 8 This allows the company to emerge from the
bankruptcy free of any form of CERCLA liability.'
From the government's perspective, this scenario creates a big problem. EPA is forced to know the potential liabilities from past disposal
remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured
A "claim" in bankruptcy is interpreted quite broadly. See Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub.
Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990) (the intent of Congress was a broad view
of a claim); H. ReP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 309 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266 ("The [Code] contemplates that all legal obligations of the
debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with m the bankruptcy case. It permits the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court."); S. REP.
No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5807-08.
11. Heidt, supra note 9, at 158.
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(1) - (4) (Supp. 1992) (a holder of a "claim" will be
allowed to share in the distribution of [the] bankruptcy estate m a Chapter 7 case); 11
U.S.C. § 1126(a)(1992) (in a Chapter 11 case, a "claim" allows the holder to vote on
the reorgaization plan, conferrng upon the holder distribution rights).
13. A discharge is a powerful tool because "creditors are prohibited from attempting to collect debts that were included in the discharge." Linda Johannsen, Note,
United States v. Whizco, Inc.. A Further Refinement of the Conflict Between Bankruptcy Discharge and Environmental Clean-up Obligations, 20 ENVTL. L. 207, 211
(1990). In all bankruptcy proceedings, whether Chapter 7, 11, or 13, only "debts" are
dischargeable. 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(b), 1141(d)(1)(A), 1328(a) (Supp. 1992). A debt is
defined in the Code as a "liability on a claim." 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (Supp. 1992). It
follows then that only claims can be debts that in turn, are allowed to be discharged.
14. See generally Joel M. Gross and Suzanne Lacampagne, Bankruptcy Estimation
of CERCLA Claims: The Process and the Alternatives, 12 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 235,240-52
(1993); Kevin J. Saville, DischargingCERCLA Liability in Bankruptcy: When Does A
Claim Arise?, 76 MINN. L. REv 327 (1991).
15. Gross & Lacampagne, supra note 14, at 244-46. Meaning, does it arise when
the PRP commits the blameworthy act?
16. Id. at 251-52. At this point, EPA has incurred the response costs for which it
can seek reimbursement under section 107 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
17. Triggering events in the middle could include the release or threatened release
of hazardous substances at the site, id. at 246-49, or when the claim is within the fair
contemplation of the parties. Id. at 249-51.
18. In general, a Chapter 11 debtor gets a discharge from all claims arising prior to
confirmation of its reorganization plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (Supp. 1992).
19. Gross & Lacampagne, supra note 14, at 242.
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practices before sites have been addressed. CERCLA revolves, to a
very high degree, around investigatory processes that take years to
undertake and to complete. Thus, from the government's perspective,
how can liability be assessed until the process of identifying the site
and cleanmg it up has been completed?
More than on any of the other issues I will cover, the courts have
ruled inconsistently on this issue, so I will not try to summarize where
they stand currently. There are courts "over here" and there are
courts "over there," and there are courts in the middle that have
adopted other triggers as to when a claim exists for bankruptcy
purposes.2 °
That is all well and good if EPA has a claim to recover the cost of a

clean-up. What if it has the right to require the liable parties to undertake the clean-up themselves? Is that, in fact, a claim? Because the

definition of claim includes rights to payment, 2 ' or equitable remedies
for breach of performance that give rise to a right to money payment,2 2 does an obligation under CERCLA to clean up property23
give rise to a right to payment of money? Again, the courts have not
ruled consistently 24
Next, an important question to ask is how does CERCLA's joint
and several liability scheme work in the bankruptcy context? 2- On the
20. Kathryn R. Heidt suggests that there are no problems determining the nature
of EPA's claim when the PRP's culpable activity, EPA's mcurment of response costs,
and EPA's uncovering of the hazard each occurs before the company has filed a bankruptcy petition. Katherine R. Heidt, The Automatic Stay in EnvironmentalBankruptcies, 67 AM. BANK. L.J. 69 (1993). CERCLA liability is a claim that can be
discharged. Id. If all of these occurrences fall into the post-petition sphere, the claims
of the government will not be discharged if they anse after the reorgnzation plan is
confirmed, or will be given an administrative expense priority if they arise before
confirmation of the plan or are considered beyond the scope of the plan. Ia The
dissension among the courts is a product of those situations where the relevant actions
of the debtor and EPA do not all occur at either the pre- or post-petition stage. See
e.g., In re Chateaugay,944 F.2d at 997 (prospective CERCLA liability is a claim that
arises at the time of the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance); In re
National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (CERCLA claim arises when
EPA is aware of the debtor's culpable conduct); United States v. Union Scrap Iron &
Metal, 123 B.R. 831 (D. Minn. 1990) (claim arises when EPA incurs response costs for
the clean-up of the hazardous waste site); AL Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. Allegheny
Int'l, Inc. (In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc.), 126 B.R. 919 (W.D. Pa.), affd, 950 F.2d 721 (3d
Cir. 1991) (concurs with Union Scrap Metal analysis of when claim arises, but differing
treatment of what claims are dischargeable).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (Supp. 1992).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B) (Supp. 1992).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. 1992).
24. See e.g., Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985) (an order to compel clean-up is a
"claim"); United States v. WlAzco, Inc., 841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988); In re Chateaugay,
944 F.2d at 997; United States v. Hubler, 117 B.R. 160 (W.D. Pa.), affd, 928 F.2d 1131
(3d Cir. 1990); In re Torwico Electronics, Inc., 8 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1993), petitionfor
cert. filed.
25. The courts, not the express language of 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. 1992), are the
source of the statute's strict liability standard. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858
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one hand, bankruptcy typically looks to substantive law to determne
liabilities, and findings typically are that when a party is jointly and
severally liable outside of bankruptcy, it ought to be jointly and severally liable m bankruptcy 2 6 On the other hand, it has been argued that
bankruptcy courts are courts of equity.' and many debtors have been
concerned about the equity of taking a party in bankruptcy that has
contributed a small percentage of the waste at a site, and subjecting it
to the entire cost of the site clean-up. Another related issue is the
extent to which contribution claims may be pursued in bankruptcy.2
Ordinarily, the Code does not allow people who hold contribution
F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988) ("We agree with the overwhelming body of precedent
that has interpreted [CERCLA] section 107(a) as establisung a strict liability
scheme."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Congress intended that responsible parties be held
strictly liable, even though an explicit provision for strict liability was not included in
the [congressional] comprouse."). Courts have followed this by reasonng that the
strict liability mandate of CERCLA unplicitly allows for a joint and several liability
scheme unless the liability is divisible and can be apportioned among the responsible
parties. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983)
("Although Congress removed joint and several liability from the CERCLA proposal,
[but instead meant] to
flus did not mean that it had rejected such an approach
have the scope of liability determined under common law principles, where a court
will assess the propriety of applying joint and several liability on an individual basis."). As a practical matter, apportionment is unlikely given the difficulty of accurately dividing up the responsibility for environmental harms. See O'Neil v. Picillo,
682 F Supp. 706, 725 (D.R.I. 1988) (holding that "the consequent injury [from contammation] is indivisible."), aff'd, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989). Also hampering a
defendant's efforts to avoid joint and several liability is the fact that the defendant has
the burden of demonstrating the feasibility of apportionment. See Monsanto, 858
F.2d at 172-73. In three recent cases, the courts of appeals in the second, third and
fifth circuits have addressed the scope of joint and several liability under CERCLA.
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v.
Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Bell Petroleum Servs., 3
F.3d 889 (5th Cir. 1993). These cases suggest that courts may be more willing to entertain defendants' fact-based assertions that the environmental harm is subject to
apportionment.
26. In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397, 415 (N.D. Tex. 1992). The view that
non-bankruptcy law should be effective in the bankruptcy process, absent some overriding bankruptcy policy, has been espoused by commentators and the Supreme
Court. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) ("Property interests are
created and defined by state law. Unless some federal interest requires a different
result, there is no reason why such interest should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding."); Douglas G. Baird,
EnvironmentalRegulation, Bankruptcy Law, and the Problem of Limited Liability, 18
EivrL. L. REP. 10,352, 10,353 (1988).
27. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988) (providing for a bankruptcy court to
"issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out
the provisions of this title [the Code]."); see also S. REP No. 95-989 at 51, reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5837; H.R. REP. No. 95-595 at 342, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6298.
28. Contribution claims exist when more than one party is liable for a particular
action or harm, and those forced to actually pay seek "contribution" from the other
liable parties. A right of contribution is explicitly created in section 113(f) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(1988).
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clais to pursue their claims in bankruptcy because of concerns that
they would conflict with those of the pnncipal creditor.29
-

On the other hand, m the Superfund context, the principal creditor
often the government - does not have the resources to pursue

every party that may be liable for a particular Superfund site. A company may only be one of a hundred or more of the liable parties at the
site that files for bankruptcy. Should an exception be made for allowing contribution 30claims to be pursued under CERCLA in the

bankruptcy context?
Another issue that has come up is the abandonment issue, and I
notice that a pertinent article on that has been published in the latest
issue of the Fordham Environmental Law Journal.3 1 This is actually
an issue that I think has gotten a great deal of notonety for semantical
reasons. When Superfund was passed, it was touted as a statute that

was going to deal with abandoned hazardous waste sites.32 Love Ca-

nal was called an abandoned hazardous waste site.3

The bankruptcy laws use the term "abandonment" in a very formal-

istic legal sense, to allow a company that does not want property that
is part of the estate, to essentially transfer the property out of the
estate.34 But because of the history of the use of the word, the issue
29. The relevant section of the Code is 11 U.S.C. § 502(e)(1)(1988): "[T]he court
shall disallow any claim for reimbursement or contribution of an entity that is liable
such
with the debtor on or has secured the claim of a creditor, to the extent that
claim for reimbursement or contribution is contingent as of the time of allowance or
disallowance of such claim for reimbursement or contribution." See In re BaldwinUnited Corp., 55 B.R. 885, 891 (Bankr. S.D. Oio 1985) ("By force, such claims are
subject to treatment under. § 502 and are subject to the discharge provisions of the
Code as well.")
30. At least one commentator thinks so. Lon Jonas, Note, Dividing the Toxic Pie:
Why Superfund Contingent Contribution Claims Should Not be Barred by the Bankruptcy Code, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv 850 (1991); see In re Charter Co., 862 F.2d 1500 (11th
Cir. 1989) (disallowing CERCLA contribution claims as contingent).
31. Stephen D. Kong, Note, A Chapter7 Trustee's Abandonment of Environmentally-ImpairedProperty:Midlantic,Post-MidlanticInterpretationand the Plague of Re-

sults-Oriented Legal Analysis, 5

FORDHAM ENVTL.

L.J. 221 (1994).

32. See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 610 F Supp. 1234, 1238 (N.D. Ill.),
rev'd, 773 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1985), judgment vacated, 479 U.S. 1002 (1986) ("CERCLA was designed to remedy hazardous waste sites, specifically abandoned or 'orphan' dump sites.") (quoting United States v. Wade, 546 F Supp. 785, 792 (E.D. Pa.
1982), appeal dismissed, 713 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1983)).
33. See Hazardous and Toxic Waste DisposalField Hearings:Joint HearingBefore
Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution and Resource Protection of the Senate
Committee on Environmental and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1979)
(statements of Sens. D. Moynihan and J. Javits).

34. See 4

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY,

554.02[2] at 554-57 (L. King et al., eds.,

15th ed. 1993) (abandonment is "a divestiture of all interests in property that were
property of the estate."); see also In re Paolella, 79 B.R. 607, 609 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1987) ("[T]he principle of abandonment was developed by the courts to protect the
bankruptcy estate from the various costs and burdens of having to administer property which could not conceivably benefit unsecured creditors of the estate."). The
relevant provision of the Code is 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988): "After notice and a hear-
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has gotten perhaps more notoriety than it deserves. It centers upon
whether a company that owns a contaminated site can essentially
divest itself of that property and have it removed from the estate.3 5
This debate does not tend to come up very often in the larger Chapter
11 cases. I think companies have learned that even if abandonment is
allowed and the company divests itself of the property, at the end of
the case the property will wind up in the possession of the reorganized
36
company. So, although the Supreme Court has addressed this issue,3 7
it is not one that has come up quite as often as one might anticipate.
But the related issue is what priority these claims should be given in
a bankruptcy context.3 8 Again, from a public policy perspective,
should compames be allowed in the bankruptcy context to say,
"Here's property that we own that is contaminated; you, the government, and you, the public, deal with it?"'39 On the other hand, from
the perspective of a debtor and other creditors who are looking at a
ing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the
estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate."
35. The Supreme Court, in Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 496 (1986), stated the issue a little differently: "[W]hether section
authorizes a trustee in bankruptcy to abandon
554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
property in contravention of state laws or regulations that are reasonably designed to
protect the public's health or safety."
36. The Midlantic majority held that "a trustee [in bankruptcy] may not abandon
property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that is reasonably designed
to protect the public health or safety from identified hazards." Id. at 507. The Court
added that "[a] Bankruptcy Court does not have the power to authorize an abandonment without formulating conditions that will adequately protect the public's health
and safety." Id. However, there was a limitation on the Court's exception to section
554: "[t]his exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by section 554
is a narrow one. It does not encompass a speculative or indeterminate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The abandonment power is not
to be fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public
health or safety from imminent and identifiable harm." Id at 507 n.9.
37. Yet, there is still much conflict among those courts trying to deal with section
554 of the Code and the ambiguity of the Midlantic decision. See In re Franklin Signal
Corp., 65 B.R. 268, 272 n.4 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986) (Midlantic was a comprormse,
"requir[ing] something more than mere consideration of state law, but something less
than full compliance."); In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943, 947-48 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1987) ("[U]nder Midlantic the Trustee could not abandon the Peerless site in
violation of CERCLA."); Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Bus. Credit (In re SmithDouglass, Inc.), 856 F.2d 12, 13 (4th Cir. 1988) (abandonment authorized, but administrative expense priority granted to state agency).
38. The problem of priority comes up most frequently in Chapter 7 liquidation
proceedings. After secured claims have been honored, 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) delineates
the nature and order of distributing the estate to various priority claimants. First
priority is granted to those who have incurred administrative expenses. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 507(a)(1), 503(b) (1988). After priority claimants get their share, whatever is left
(often nothing) is distributed to the non-priority unsecured creditors.
39. The contention that EPA and state environmental agencies have nothing more
than an unsecured claim when they try to get a site cleaned up is the minority view.
See e.g., In re Johnson, 758 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1985); Daniel Klerman, Note, Earth
First? CERCLA Reimbursement Claims and Bankruptcy, 58 U. CHi. L. REv 795
(1991).
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typically inadequate estate, should the clean-up obligations have priority over all other obligations, which would often mean no money
would be available to any other creditors? Is that fair?' Is it fair
when the government has a Superfund that can be used to address the
site and other creditors, that often tort creditors who have been victims of the very conduct that the Superfund clean-up is designed to
address, are not able to share in the bankruptcy estate?
Those are some of the main issues that have come up in this area
and are likely to continue to surface. The good news is that those of
us who have spent a lot of time learning these issues and coming to
grips with them are unlikely to have to start from scratch after
Superfund Reauthorization, because as I said, Superfund
Reauthorization does not address these issues.
I have a few thoughts on why that is. First, I think if these issues
were going to be addressed legislatively, the appropriate place to do it
would be in the bankruptcy code amendment process and not in
Superfund Reauthorization. If such issues were addressed in
Superfund Reauthorization, we would still have state Superfund statutes 4 ' and RCRA, 42 which incorporates clean up provisions as well as

other environmental statutes raising similar issues.4'
I think the logical place to face these issues would be in bankruptcy
legislation, which is also undergoing review and is a subject of much
attention in Congress."4 There have been proposals on both sides as
to how these issues could be addressed, 45 but I think the perception
probably is that while these are issues that people focus great attention on, things are not fundamentally broken. On the one hand, it is
difficult to point to cases where viable companies attempted to reor40. This is the majority view, that "since compliance with environmental laws is a
prerequisite to abandonment, the costs expended in achieving compliance and in ultimately assuring the public health are a necessary cost of preserving the estate [and

given administrative expense priority]." Jill Thompson Losch, Comment, Bankruptcy
v. Environmental Obligations:Clash of the Titans, 52 LA. L. REv 137, 163 (1991). For
additional support of this stance, see Gary E. Claar, The Casefor a Bankruptcy Code
Priorityfor Environmental Cleanup Claims, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV 29 (1992);
Joseph P Cistulli, Note, Striking a Balance Between Competing Policies: The Adminstrative Claim as an Alternative to Enforce State Clean-up Orders in Bankruptcy Pro-

ceedings, 16 B.C. ENvmL. A-F. L. REv 581 (1989).
41. See, e.g., Carpenter-Presley-Tanner Hazardous Substance Account Act, CAL.
§ 25,300 - 25,395 (West 1992); The Michigan Environmental Response Act, MICH. COMp. L. §§ 299.601-299.618 (1979 & Supp. 1992); Spill
HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE

Compensation and Control Act, N.J.

STAT. ANN.

99 58:10-23.11-23.29 (West 1992);

see generally Linda L. Butler, State Environmental Programs:A Study in PoliticalInfluence and Regulatory Failure,31 WM. & MARY L. REv 823 (1990).
42. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795
(codified at 42 U.S.C. 99 6901-6991i (Supp. 1992)).
43. See supra note 9.

44. See S. 540, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (bankruptcy bill emerging from the
Senate Judiciary Committee on Sept. 15, 1993).
45. A comprehensive proposal for addressing these issues was put forth last year
by the National Bankruptcy Conference.
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ganize-which is really the fundamental goal of the bankruptcy lawsbut could not because of CERCLA liabilities. 46 Conversely, from the
environmental perspective, bankruptcies have not, to a fundamental
degree, interfered with EPA's ability to enforce the Superfund program. I make this claim even though bankruptcy cases can be somewhat of a nuisance and take up a significant part of my work.4 7 They
have, to a fundamental degree, interfered with EPA's ability to enforce the Superfund program.
And perhaps for those reasons, and also because of the lack of clarity in the two statutes, those of us who practice in this area have been
forced to deal with what bankruptcy in general intends, particularly in
the reorganization context, which is for the parties involved to come
up with negotiated resolutions of these problems. Thus, in the larger
Chapter 11 cases, LTV being one example, the very fact of the uncertainty in the law has forced the parties in those cases to come up with
solutions that meet both the goals of the Bankruptcy Code - allowing
viable companies to reorganize - and the goals of the environmental
48
laws, focusing efforts on clean up rather than on litigation.
That represents a quick overview of some of the issues in this area,
and the only other thing I would like to note, maybe as a lead in to
Mr. White's talk on where Reauthorization is going,49 is to remark
that when Superfund was last amended in 1986 through the SARA
amendments,5 0 some of us observed that instead of naming the statute
"SARA," Congress ought to have named it "RACHEL," on the
theme of Biblical matnarchs; RACHEL being the Reauthorization
Amendments Clarifying How Everyone is Liable. The ball has now
swung in the other direction, and I think those of us who have been
working in this area might now look at the new amendments and
think that they should be entitled "REBECCA," the Reauthorization
Elinimating Banks and Eliminating Cities from CERCLA Altogether.
There are many pending cases in the federal courts that could possibly further inform the bar about law in this area. The Supreme Court
46. See also Thomas Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the
Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982) (espousing the "creditors' bargain"
model); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775 (1987) (the
traditional conception of the purposes of bankruptcy).
47 See Bankruptcy, EnvironmentalLawyers Focus on Clash Between Two Areas,
BANKR. L. DAILY (BNA) (June 6, 1990) (Joel M. Gross states that 12-15% of the
Justice Department's Environmental Enforcement Division's cases involve bankruptcy law); Firestone, Government Perspectives on Bankruptcy and Environmental
Law Interaction,10 ENv-IL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,358 (1988) (in 1988, 58 of the
600 pending environmental cases for the Department of Justice were bankruptcy
cases).
48. In re Chateaugay,944 F.2d at 997; Settlement Agreement and Stipulated Order, In re Chateaugay Corp., (No. 88-083V) (April 15, 1993).
49. See William H. White, Reauthorization Overview, EPA's Perspective, 5 FoRDHAM ENVmL.

L.J. 299 (1994).

50. See supra note 2.
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took on two cases m this area during the mid-1980s, the Kovacs case 5
and the Midlanticcase,52 the former case dealing with the ability of an
individual who had operated a Superfund site to get a discharge of his

dealing with the issue of
obligation to clean it up,5 3 and the latter case
54
abandonment of contaminated property.

There are a number of pending issues in this area. One particularly

noteworthy case that I would point to that is the Torwico case.55

There, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that a debtor who no
longer owned the contaminated property could be required by the
State of New Jersey to clean up that property.56 This is really the first
case that has gone that far, and the ramifications could be, if looked at

from a certain perspective, that CERCLA liabilities would essentially
survive a bankruptcy unaffected. The debtor57 in Torwico has filed a
petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court.
In addition to well over a hundred cases in this area that have been
decided, there are numerous cases pending in the federal courts.
Our goal in the bankruptcy context has been to reach settlements to
the extent possible,5 and we have been negotiating them very much

along the lines suggested by the proposed legislation.59
The bankruptcy practice in general has often been criticized for
high transaction costs. 60 Such costs have also led to critical discussion

51. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
52. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494
(1986).
53. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 276.
54. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 496.
55. Torwico, 8 F.3d at 146.
56. Id. at 150-51.
57 The petition was filed on January 24, 1994.
58. As one commentator points out, EPA has an incentive to settle because of
the costs of litigating CERCLA liability, inability of single PRPs to shoulder
the total responsibility for a particular site, and the realization that, given
limited Superfund resources, PRP-led remedial actions rather than
Superfund expenditure and reimbursement actions must increase if a significant impact is to be made on existing NPL sites.
Philippe J. Kahn, Note, Bankruptcy Versus Environmental Protection:Discharging
Future CERCLA Liability in Chapter 11, 14 CARDOZO L. RaV. 1999, 2050 (1993).
Kahn also recognizes that such settlements are good for both the reorganizing debtor
and the creditors because there is: (1) accurate assessment of liability; (2) greater
likelihood of apportioned liability; (3) protection from contribution actions; (4) reduced transaction costs m determining liability; (5) options for reimbursement or remedial action; and (6) consideration of equitable factors in determining liability. Id.
at 2052-53.
59. See Gross and Lacampagne, supra note 14, at 267-69.
60. See 11 U.S.C. § 330 (Supp. 1992) (the court has the power to award compensation to attorneys and other professionals employed by the relevant interested parties);
11 U.S.C. § 331 (Supp. 1992) (authorizing interim payments before administrative expense hearings); 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2) (Supp. 1992) (allowing § 330(a) compensation
as adminstrative expenses); 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (Supp. 1992) (administrative expenses granted first payment priority).
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regarding Superfund.61 Our view has been that the last thing we really
needed was to be spending a lot of time litigating Superfund issues in
the context of bankruptcy cases. So, we have tried to avoid that process and to achieve fair results.
Frequently, we are confronted by Superfund sites where the party
in bankruptcy is one of a hundred parties who contributed waste to
the site, and under existing law, we have looked to the other ninetynine to make up the shortfall. We could say, "Well this is not our
problem, it's your problem." 62
However, the law has tended to indicate that those mnety-nme parties would have a difficult, if not impossible, time pursuing a contribution claim in the bankruptcy. 63 Our view has been that either we
pursue the debtor in bankruptcy or this company gets off entirely. Accordingly, we tell the debtor that it is more than fair that we participate in the bankruptcy process like other creditors. It is not fair that
they get a complete exemption on these claims, so we participate in
the bankruptcy process to get a reasonable distribution to the extent
the case will allow. The mandatory but non-binding allocation envisioned by the Superfund Reform Act would provide a useful means
for determining what the contribution would be for the debtor.
Therefore, anything which would allow the bankruptcy process to
work in a way which is fair to all of the parties at a site is something
that we have supported and will continue to support in this area.
In addition to improving the fairness of the bankruptcy process, we
have made progress in achieving some certainty as well, as evidenced
by the LTV decisionfr 4 We filed a complaint in that case seeking a
determination as to what claims could and could not be discharged in
the bankruptcy 65 One of the reasons we did that was because we
found ourselves in a dilemma. As I said earlier, there is an issue as to
when the claim arises. 66 Having a claim is both good and bad. It is
good because you can share in the estate; 67 it is bad because then the
61. William N. Hedeman et al., Superfund Transaction Costs: A CriticalPerspective on the Superfund Liability Scheme, 21 ENvrL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,413,

10,414 (1991); Kit R. Knckenberger & Pamela Rekar, Superfund Settlements: Breaking the Logjam, 19 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2384, 2386 (1989); William W Balcke, Note,

Superfund Settlements: The FailedPromise of the 1986 Amendments, 74 VA. L. REv
123, 124 (1988). As Justice O'Connor recently noted: "An entity in bankruptcy can ill
afford to waste resources on litigations: every dollar spent on lawyers is a dollar creditors will never see." Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnersip,

113 S. Ct. 1489, 1505 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
62. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.

64. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir.
1991).
65. Id. at 999.
66. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
67. Heidt, supra note 9, at 159.
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claim is discharged.6 In some cases, if one is looking at it purely from
a self-interest perspective, having the claim would be better. In Chapter 7 cases, where the company liquidates and dissolves, discharge is
irrelevant.6 9 This is your one bite at the apple. It is better to have a
claim. In a case where a company is reorganizing and will remain m
existence, not having a claim means you can go after it for the claim m
full after the bankruptcy.7 0 We had a conflict, but we also recognized
that having certainty in this area would allow the system to work better. We filed a complaint and took the case to the Second Circuit,
which adopted the nddle-ground stance that the standard was the
release of hazardous substances. 7 1 Frankly, the decision went closer
to what the debtors in that case were arguing for, but still we thought
this was a good thing, because at least now we would have some guidance as to what can and what cannot be addressed in the bankruptcy.
Finally, m the area of bankruptcy trustee's personal liability, there is
nothing specifically addressing bankruptcy trustees, but there is something to deal with the liability of trustees more generally72 that would
cover bankruptcy trustees as well, and that will be addressed by other
speakers later in the course of the day The only thing I would add is
that while there is a great deal of concern about personal liability of
bankruptcy trustees,73 in the fourteen years that Superfund has been
active, there has not been a single case where the federal government,
at least, has asserted a claim against a bankruptcy trustee in his or her
individual capacity. 74 So, although there certainly is anxiety out
there, 75 it is not anything for which we will take responsibility.

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. In re Chateaugay,944 F.2d at 1005.

72. S. 1834 § 605.

73. See generally Douglas M. Garrou, Note, The Potentially Responsible Trustee:
ProbableTargetfor CERCLA Liability, 77 VA. L. REv 113 (1991); D. Ethan Jeffery,
Personal Liability of a Bankruptcy Trustee Since Midlantic National Bank v. New
Jersey Departmentof Environmental Protection: The Environmental Law and Bankruptcy Code Conflict Threatens to Engulf Bankruptcy Trustees, 2 VILL. ENVTL. L.J.
403 (1991).
74. The same cannot be said for all state agencies, although their efforts to hold
the trustees personally liable have failed. See, e.g., In re Sundance Corp., 149 B.R. 641
(Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1993); State v. Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 483 N.W 2d 574 (Wis.
1992).
75. See In re Milbar Blvd., Inc., 91 B.R. 213 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988) (the court
authorizes umque conveyance of the possessory interest in the contaminated property
to EPA m order to avoid any possibility of the bankruptcy trustee incurring personal
liability).

